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1 Introduction
Environmental policies are often negotiated by special environmental committees that involve rep-
resentatives from several stakeholder groups with divergent interests. This raises several important
questions related to the relationship between the design of the decision making process and the ef-
fectiveness with which participating stakeholders can pursue their individual interests [18]. To what
extent is a given policy maker able to inuence the outcome? How is it possible to assess whether or
not the interests of di¤erent stakeholder groups are fairly represented? How should a committee be
designed to have a fair representation of di¤erent interests? In this paper I address these questions in
the context of water policy in France.
Water Agencies (WAs) are important water policy institutions in many countries, including France.
The overal purpose of WAs is to protect water against any action which can deteriorate its quality and
quantity. The main focus of current policy is on reaching an adequate ecological and chemical state of
river basin resources while maintaining a balance between available water resources and water needs. In
practice, this translates into a set of practical objectives, such as the reduction of the impact of human
activities on aquatic ecosystems, maintaining the natural processes of aquatic ecosystems, promoting
the quantitative management of river streams   in particular during the summer   managing ground
water resources in a sustainable manner, improving the quality of drinking water, etc.
Since the middle of 1960s, the French water policy has relied on the principle of decentralized
management of the water resource by river basin. In each of the six French WAs, there is a River
Basin Committee (RBC) acting as a water parliament. Consisting of elected members of local and
parliamentary chambers, water users representatives and the public administration, the RBCs are
responsible for specifying the environmental objectives of the river basin through voting on di¤erent
issues.
The focus of this research is the decision making process within environmental committees. The
main goals are to synthesize a number of tools and methods from di¤erent elds (such as political
science, welfare economics and game theory), and to show how they can be adapted and applied to
the particular case of the French RBCs. Specically, I analyze how the composition of the committee
and the voting rules relate to the voting power of di¤erent decision makers in di¤erent types of
voting situations. I also discuss the problem of fair representation of di¤erent interests within the
environmental committees. I believe this analysis may provide relevant insights to the recent policy
debates related to water policy in France.
The traditional power measures, such as the Shapley-Shubik index [36] and the Banzhaf index
[34, 4], have been widely discussed and applied to analyze many voting institutions, such as the EU
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Council of Ministers [22, 32, 33, 15, 8], the United States Legislative system [37, 14], and the Canadian
Constitutional Amendment Scheme [37]. The Banzhaf index has been also used to study the design
of voting bodies in the EU, US, or IMF [5, 15, 16, 19, 24, 28]. To the best of my knowledge, to date
no one has used the concepts of voting power to examine these issues in the context of environmental
committees in general, and the French RBCs in particular.
In this paper I apply di¤erent power measures traditionally used in the literature, as well as some
lesser known measures in this context, in order to analyze the power distribution in two types of voting
situations. The rst type is the binary setting, in which a decision maker can vote either yes or
no, such as in a decision whether or not to construct a dam. However, not all voting situations can
be classied as binary, as in, for example, the surplus distribution between stakeholders. I consider
such distributive issuesas a second type of voting situation. One of the examples of a distributive
situation is the funding of local projects by the RBC through subsidies. The main di¤erence with
the binary setting is that in a distributive setting the set of alternatives is a simplex. Additionally,
in the context of the RBCs, in the distributive situations three water users (domestic, industrial and
agricultural) usually benet from the surplus distribution, while other decision makers also vote on
the decision. In contrast, there are may be more beneciaries in the binary situations.
In the binary setting, I use the Banzhaf and the Shapley-Shubik indices that are well adapted for
this situation. They measure the probability of a voter to cast a decisive vote. In the context of
the distributive situations, the Shapley-Shubik index has also been shown to be an appropriate power
measure [14]. It evaluates a voters expected relative share in a xed budget. Apart from the Shapley-
Shubik index, I introduce two other measures of power suitable for analyzing distributive situations.
The rst is the nucleolus, which is not well known in this context but is becoming more popular, as
it can be a good alternative to the Shapley-Shubik index [31, 25, 17]. Another power measure applied
in the numerical analysis is derived as the vector of the unique expected equilibrium payo¤s from a
well known legislative bargaining game [7]. Interestingly, under some conditions it coincides with the
nucleolus [29].
In the second part of the paper, I employ power measures to investigate how to design an RBC
with a fair representation of di¤erent interests. A similar question has been already addressed in the
literature in the context of international committees, but mostly under the binary setting.1 One of
the common approaches is the utilitarian one2 that seeks to maximize the total utility of all citizens.
Another is the egalitarian approach that seeks to equalize the power of all citizens as measured by
the Banzhaf index. Felsenthal and Machover [14] adopt the egalitarian approach and show that the
1Le Breton et al. [25] is an exception.
2See for example, [6], [9] and [10].
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optimal weights should be chosen in such a way that each countrys Banzhaf index is proportional to
the square root of its population size (Penroses rule [34]). By comparing the Banzhaf index and the
square root of the population, they show that larger member states in the EU tend to have too little
power, while the smaller ones have too much power. Algaba et al. [1] apply this theory to analyze the
power of the European citizens for 25 and 27 countries. Le Breton et al. [25] also follow the egalitarian
approach, however they use the distributive setting with the nucleolus as the power measure. In order
to investigate this question for the French RBCs, I apply three di¤erent power measures suitable for
the distributive setting and implement both aforementioned principles. This analysis may provide
useful tools for checking the recent conclusion of the French audit o¢ ce that the RBCscomposition
is imbalanced in the sense that the agricultural users have a quasi-monopoly[12].
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, the organization and the functioning of WAs in
France are briey described. Section 3 provides a descriptive analysis of power for di¤erent groups
participating in the decision making process related to the water policy. In the rst part, I focus on
the Banzhaf and the Shapley-Shubik indices to analyze the binary setting. As the analysis demon-
strates, in general, the two indices give very close predictions. Then, following [37], I describe possible
modications of the classical indices which may be more applicable in the few cases where the Banzhaf
and the Shapley-Shubik indices produce signicantly di¤erent results. In the second part, I consider
distributive situations and compare the performance of the three power measures adapted to the analy-
sis. Additionally, I characterize the conditions under which all three produce the same predictions. In
Section 4, I address the issue of the optimal RBC design under the distributive setting, and provide an
illustration on the data for the Adour-Garonne Water Agency. Finally, Section 5 provides a summary
of the main ndings and some policy implications.
2 French River Basin Committees
The French WAs were created in 1966, following the rst Water Act of 1964 which institutionalized a
decentralized water management system at the hydro-geographical level of the river basin. This system
has been reinforced by the subsequent Water Acts of 19923 and 2006.4 The six WAs (Adour-Garonne,
3The Water Act of January 2, 1992 instituted the principles and tools of integrated water management by the RB.
These new tools are the SDAGE (Schémas Directeurs dAménagement et de Gestion des Eaux) and the SAGE (Schémas
dAménagement et de Gestion des Eaux).
4The reform of 2006 was devoted to making the system compliant with the Constitution, by reinforcing the role of
the RBC, while maintaining control from the State. The goal of the reform was also to improve operational e¢ ciency
and to provide enough exibility in the determination of taxes.
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Artois-Picardie, Loire-Bretagne, Rhin-Meuse, Rhône-Méditerranée-Corse and Seine-Normandie) are
public administrative establishments under the supervision of two ministries: the Ministry of the
Environment and the Ministry of Finance.
WAs participate at each river basin level in national and the European water policies by developing
a strategy originating from an overall view of water issues. WAs contribute to reaching an adequate
state for water bodies by reducing the impact of human activities, preserving water resources and by
satisfying user needs by balancing water resources and rational water use.
Often presented as water parliaments, RBCs perform several functions. They participate in the
design and adoption of multi-year intervention programmes, they determine the major priorities of the
intervention policies of the WAs, and they vote on the tax basis and emission tax rates and on the
general conditions for attribution of subsidies to water related projects.5 The Executive Board rst
constructs and then submits a proposal to the RBC for approval. The decisions are taken by majority
rule, i.e., approval by at least half the participants is necessary to pass a proposal. In what follows, I
assume 100% participation, however some RBCs have explicit quorum requirements.
Each RBC has three bodies: local elected persons, water users (agriculture, industry, domestic
water users) and representatives of the State (administration). Each body elects the administrators
of the WA from among its members. The government determines the number of Basin Committee
members, including the representation of each category of users (agriculture, tourism, industry, etc.).
Representatives of the State from various ministries as well as from the State prefectures are also
included. For example, in the Adour-Garonne RBC in 2012 there were 135 members divided into
three bodies: the rst body of 54 members representing the local communities; the second body of 54
members representing users and professional bodies; and the third body of 27 members representing
the State and public boards. The rst body is composed of representatives from the regions, the large
and the small municipalities (with a qualication for the municipalities located in either mountain
areas or seaside areas). The second body has nine representatives from agriculture, 27 representatives
from industry and 18 representatives from di¤erent associations (e.g., consumers, environmentalists),
regional social and economic councils and groups of experts.
The composition of the RBCs depends on the geographical range of the basin with a minimum of
58 members in Rhin-Meuse RBC in the period 1993-1998 and a maximum of 187 members in Seine-
Normandie in the period 2005-2007. The proportion of representatives for local communities, regions
and districts is signicant, compared to the representatives of water users. Representatives from
5There are several commissions within an RBC, which are delegated by the Executive Board of WAs to work on
important projects, for example, the Subsidy Commission.
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the agricultural sector are typically more numerous in the RBCs characterized by higher agricultural
activity, as in Adour-Garonne and Loire-Bretagne. Representatives of the State are in the minority
while the number of local elected persons is greater than one third on average. Representatives of users
and socio-professional groups have the majority. In 1999, the composition of the RBCs and Executive
Boards in all WAs was renewed in order to reinforce representation of urban and rural communities,
consumer associations, environmental associations, agriculture, and a new representative for small-
and medium-sized industries. There are now about 40% of elected members for local communities,
40% for water user representatives, and 20% for representatives of the State.
3 Descriptive analysis of power
3.1 Binary Issues: The Banzhaf and the Shapley-Shubik power indices
In this subsection, we consider binary yes/no decisions by the committee. For simplicity, we
assume that amendments to the proposal are not possible. In this setting, a priori power of a voter
is usually measured by the probability of the voter being pivotal. In this context, the two classical
voting power measures   namely the Banzhaf and the Shapley-Shubik power indices   are most often
used in the literature. First, I recall the formal denitions, and then provide numerical results for the
two indices applied to the six French RBCs in the period 1987-2007.
In what follows, N denotes a set of the n members of an RBC. We also dene a set of winning
coalitions W: a collection of subsets of N with the following properties:
1) ; =2 W;
2) N 2 W;
3) if S 2 W and T  S then T 2 W (monotonicity).
The interpretation of the setW as follows: If S is a set of members voting in favour of a particular
decision then the decision is accepted if S 2 W and it fails if S =2 W. Sets that do not belong to W
are called losing coalitions. A pair (N;W) is called a simple game, and fully describes an RBC.
The Shapley-Shubik index (SSI) for a simple game (N;W) is dened as follows. The players vote
in a specic order and as a majority is reached the proposal is accepted. The voter whose participation
turns the existing coalition from a losing into a winning one is called critical for that ordering. The
critical voter is assumed to get the credit for having passed the bill. The SSI is then determined
through the assumption of a random voting order:
i =
number of orderings in which i is critical
total number of orderings
.
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One may notice that
nX
i=1
i = 1, i.e., the vector  = (1; 2; :::; n), is normalized.
The Banzhaf index of a simple game (N;W) is introduced in a di¤erent way. One denes a swing
for any player i as a winning coalition S containing i and such that i0s departure from S would change
coalition S from winning to losing. Let us dene:
0i =
number of swings for i
2n 1
.
Vector 0 = (01; 
0
2; :::; 
0
n) is called absolute Banzhaf power and, in fact, is not normalized. The
normalized version of this measure (the Banzhaf power index (Bz)), is given by:
i =
0i
nX
i=1
0i
.
In what follows, I focus on the power analysis for the six French RBCs in the period 1987-2007. The
voting situations in RBCs can be represented through weighted majority games. The game (N;W)
is said to be a weighted majority game if there exists an n-tuple ! = (!1; :::; !n) of non-negative
weights with !1 + !2 + ::: + !n = 1 and a non-negative quota q such that any S 2 W, if and only if
the total weight of the players in S exceeds the quota q, i.e.,
P
i2S !i  q: The pair [q;!] is called a
representation of the game (N;W). In order to run the calculations, it is necessary to have information
on the number of representatives in the committees (provided in the Appendix) and the quota. Given
that the decisions are taken by the majority rule, the quota is calculated as q =
jPn
i=1 qi
2
k
.6
Table 6 in the Appendix provide calculations for the distribution of power among di¤erent decision
makers in the Adour-Garonne RBC in the period 1987  2007.7 The results indicate that the Bz and
the SSI give very close predictions in most cases. Not surprisingly, districts have a very high voting
power, around 30%, while industrial users have around 15%. There are also many small groups with
relatively low values of the Bz and the SSI.
It is important to distinguish voting weight from power, as in general the voting power need not be
proportional to voting weights.8 However, in our case (see Table 6), the power indices for the RBCs
are almost proportional to the weights. Here we deal with a situation where there is a large number
of players and none of them is dominant enough. It seems that in this case Penroses approximation9
6For any real number x, bxc denotes the smallest integer greater than x.
7I use computer software for the voting power analysis available at http://homepages.warwick.ac.uk/~ecaae/ (ac-
cessed February 2015). Calculations for other RBCs are available in the earlier version of the paper.
8A striking example is the EU Council of Ministers in the period 1958-1972: even though Luxembourg held one vote,
formally it was never able to make any di¤erence in the voting process.
9See, for example, [23].
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works well. It states that voting power tends to become proportional to voting weights as the number
of voters increases, provided that the distribution of voting weights is not too unequal. In fact, when
the players are put into a smaller number of blocks, the power indices are no longer proportional to
the weights.10
There are some intuitive properties that the Bz and the SSI satisfy. For example, both indices
respect monotonicity. Whenever representative i has more votes than representative j, the voting
power of i is higher than the power of j. However, the relation of voting weights to the power is not as
straightforward. One may think that it is possible to decrease a voters voting weight within a voting
body and at the same time increase his/her power, however this is not always the case. It is called the
paradox of redistribution[14]. The idea is that there is a voter donatingsome weight to another
voter, so that the donor loses weight and the recipient gains some weights, while the total weight stays
the same. The paradox of redistribution states that a donor can gain power or a recipient can lose
power. This is the case for industry in the Adour-Garonne RBC (see Table 7 in the Appendix): the
relative number of votes for professional bodies as well as for rural communities has dropped from the
period 1993-1998 to the period 1999-2004. However, both the Bz and the SSI show an increase in
power.
3.1.1 Extensions
In this section I discuss possible modications of the Bz and the SSI which may be more applicable
when the interests of some groups are correlated.
Stra¢ n [37] has proved that the Bz and the SSI can be derived from the same basic probabilistic
model under di¤erent assumptions regarding voting behaviour. The Bz is obtained under the assump-
tion that the voters vote completely independently (independence assumption). In contrast, the SSI is
obtained under the assumption that the voters have some common standards or values (homogeneity
assumption).
Suppose that Xi is a random variable for each i = 1:::n. It takes value 1 if player i votes yeson
the given proposal, and 0 if player i votes no. Let us denote by p = (p1; :::; pn), the vector with the
components pi 2 [0; 1] being the probability that Xi = 1. For di¤erent proposals, the components pi
are selected from some probability distribution on [0; 1]. The Independence Assumption states that the
pis are selected independently from the uniform distribution on [0; 1]. This assumption implies that
each player will vote in favour of any decision with the probability 1=2. The Homogeneity Assumption
states that a number p is selected from the uniform distribution on [0; 1], and pi = p for all i. Stra¢ n
10See discussion in the following subsection and Table 7 for the Adour-Garonne RBC in the Appendix.
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[37] proves that the answer to the question, What is the probability that the bill supported by player
i pass?is given by the absolute Banzhaf measure 0i under the independence assumption, and is given
by the SSI under the homogeneity assumption.
One may argue that the assumption of the uniform distribution is restrictive. Thus, Berg [11]
proposes to introduce a general probability density function f dened on the interval [0; 1]. Then, the
modied homogeneity assumption states that a number p is drawn according to the distribution f on
[0; 1], and pi = p for all i. In the case of beta distribution:
f(p) =
 (2)
( ())2
p(1  p);
where parameter  > 0 and   is gamma function.11 One may calculate:
Pr(Xi = 1 and Xj = 1) =
1Z
0
p2f(p)dp =
1
4
+
1
4(2 + 1)
:
Then the covariance is:
cov(Xi; Xj) =
1
4(2 + 1)
,
and the correlation coe¢ cient between the votes of two voters is:
 =
1
2 + 1
.
When  ! 0 one gets  ! 1 (perfect positive correlation) and when  ! 1 one gets  ! 0
(independence).
When  = 1 we get the block model [14], in which some representatives always vote in the same
way (form blocks). In the Appendix there is an example of gathering di¤erent representatives into 11
blocks according to the similarity of their preferences.12 The rst three categories correspond to water
users (those paying emission and water use taxes, and receiving subsidies from the WA), while other
categories are special-interest groups, ministries and administration. The values for the SSI and the
Bz for the Adour-Garonne RBC in such a case are shown in Table 7 (see Appendix).
One may think that when assigning representatives in the same block, their total power should be
at least as great as the sum of the power assigned to the same representatives in the original setting
before the formation of the block. While it may seem intuitive, in general this property does not hold.
It is called the paradox of large size or the superadditivity property [14].
11The case  = 1 represents the uniform distribution.
12For a more accurate analysis it is neccessary to have data on the actual votes of the di¤erent representatives in the
six RBCs, which is not available.
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3.2 Distributive Issues
The analysis of distributive issues in RBCs   such as taxes and subsidies   has some specicities.
There are usually three groups, i.e., domestic water users, industrial water users and the farmers
contributing to the budget by paying di¤erent taxes. They may benet from the redistribution by
receiving subsidies in order to nance di¤erent projects. However, all members of the committee  
including representatives of the administration   participate in the decision making process. The
representatives of water users in the committee are assumed to be selsh, i.e., driven exclusively by
their own shares in the proposal. In contrast, the preferences of the other committee members can
possibly aggregate the welfare of the three categories of users.
Here, I impose a simplifying assumption that each representative of the administration acts on
behalf of a single group of users. Formally, the water users are indexed by i = 1; 2; 3 and the repre-
sentatives of the administration by j = 4; : : : ; n. Let us denote by !i the voting weight (number of
representatives) of sector i for all i = 1; :::; 3. All other voters have a weight equal to 1. Let us denote
by mi the number of representatives in the set f4; :::; ng acting on behalf of user i. We have:
3X
i=1
mi = n  3:
The group of voters voting on behalf of the group i = 1:::3 has a weight equal to:
qi = !i +mi: (1)
We have obtained a new weighted majority game with three players [q; q1; q2; q3], where the quota
q is the same as before. In fact, for three groups there are very few possible games. Hereafter I will
consider two classes of games. The rst, K1, is the class consisting of weighted majority games which
are monotonic,13 proper14 and directed.15 Following [25] for three players there are ve possible games
in class K1:
1) [1; 1; 0; 0] in which player 1 is a dictator,
2) [3; 2; 1; 1] in which player 1 is a veto player16 but not a dictator,
3) [2; 1; 1; 0] in which players 1 and 2 are veto players,
4) [3; 1; 1; 1] in which all three players are veto players,
5) [2; 1; 1; 1] which is the simple majority game with no veto players.
The second class, K2, is the class of weighted majority games which are strong.17 In the case of
13Adding players cannot turn a winning coalition into a losing one.
14No two disjoint coalitions can be winning.
15Players can be unambiguously ranked in order of desirability.
16A player that belongs to all minimal winning coalitions is called a veto player.
17For any coalition S =2 W coalition NnS 2 W.
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three players, K2 consists of only two possible games: the simple majority game and the dictator game.
As one may conrm, a weighted majority game with a quota of 50% of the total votes (as in the French
RBC) belongs to K2:
Example: The Adour-Garonne RBC, 1987-2007
In this example, I group the decision makers in the Adour-Garonne RBC into three groups by
attributing the votes of state representatives and other non-users to the three water user groups
following (1). The above remark implies that as a result, one may get either the simple majority or
the dictatorial game.
To proceed in a rigorous manner, one would need the data on actual votes in the committee,
which are not available. Instead, I assume that all of the representatives of the rural communities,
the Ministries of Agriculture, Land Development and Rural A¤airs vote in line with the farmers. The
representatives of the associations of domestic water users, environmental organizations, shery, water
suppliers, tourism, and the Ministries of Health, the Environment and the Interior all cast their votes
on behalf of domestic water users. The representatives of the Ministry of Industry have their votes in
line with the industrial users. Other RBC members who are not water users split their votes equally
between the three groups. As a result, one gets the distribution of seats between the three user groups,
as presented in Table 1.
Table 1 Distribution of Representatives in the Adour-Garonne RBC, 1987-2007
1987-1992 1993-1998 1999-2004 2005-2007
Agriculture 22:67 21:33 25:67 24
Industry&Energy 27:67 27:33 28:67 29
Domestic 33:67 32:33 43:67 44
Total 84 81 98 97
Quota 43 41 50 49
Table 1 demonstrates that for all four periods, the distribution of seats and the quota correspond
to the simple majority game [2; 1; 1; 1].
The most famous power measure applied in the distributive situations is the SSI.18 Thus, Felsen-
thal and Machover [14] argue that the SSI is a measure of P-power, where P stands for purse,
and evaluates a voters expected relative share in a xed budget. In addition, I describe below two
alternative power measures.
18For the denitions and the properties see, for example, [14] and [21], among others.
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3.2.1 The Nucleolus
The nucleolus (Nucl) is a solution concept for cooperative games, rst formulated in [35]. As it is
argued in [29, 25, 17], the nucleolus is a measure suitable for analyzing the bargaining over a xed
budget, and can be a good alternative to the SSI.
Mashler et al. [26] provide the following intuitive meaning of the nucleolus. Suppose there is an
arbitrator who helps the players decide on the allocation of the common budget. The excess of a
coalition (the gain/loss that the members of the coalition have if they depart from it) is a measure of
dissatisfaction. The coalitions with a negative excess do not want to defect, and the higher the excess
of the coalition, the higher the coalition dissatisfaction. Thus, the arbitrator will look for payo¤s in
which the highest excess is as low as possible. If there are several such payo¤s, he will proceed in a
recursive manner: he chooses the outcomes for which the second highest excess is minimal, and so on.
The nucleolus recursively minimizes the dissatisfactionof the worst treated coalitions. The formal
denition of the nucleolus is provided in [26], among others.
It appears that the nucleolus of a game in coalitional form exists and is unique. If the core is not
empty, the nucleolus is in the core. Like the Shapley value, the nucleolus can be obtained as the unique
value satisfying a set of axioms [27].
3.2.2 Bargaining and Power
In this section, we describe the power of the players as the expected equilibrium payo¤s from a
popular legislative bargaining game [7] adapted for our specic setting. As previously discussed, the
main specicity here is that all of the decision makers in the RBC participate in the decision regarding
the distribution of the surplus, however, only three water user groups actually benet from the nal
distribution.
The bargaining proceeds as follows. At every round t = 1; 2,... Nature selects a random proposer:
player j is selected with probability pj with j = 1; ::; n. This player proposes a distribution of the
budget (x1; x2; x3) with xi  0 for all i = 1; 2; 3 and
P3
i=1 xi = 1. Due to our assumption regarding
the behaviour of the representatives from the administration, the probability of player i = 1; 2; 3 being
selected as a proposer is equal to bpi = pi+Pk2Mi pk. The proposal is voted upon immediately according
to the voting rule represented by a voting game [q; q1; q2; q3] as derived above. If the coalition of voters
in favour of the proposal is winning, the proposal is implemented and the game ends; otherwise the
game proceeds to the next period in which Nature selects a new proposer. Players are risk neutral and
discount future payo¤s by a factor j 2 [0; 1). A (pure) strategy for player j is a sequence j = (tj)1t=1,
where tj; the tth round strategy of player j, prescribes:
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1. A proposal x,
2. A response function assigning yesor noto all possible proposals by the other players.
The solution concept is the stationary subgame perfect equilibrium (SSPE).19 Banks and Duggan
[3] have shown that an SSPE always exists in this type of bargaining model. In addition, Eraslan [13]
has shown that all SSPE lead to the same expected equilibrium payo¤s.20
Following [30] and [25] we consider a specic case where  ! 1 and equal recognition probabilities.
In this case, we refer to the unique vector of expected equilibrium payo¤s such as the Baron-Ferejohn
measure of power attached to the simple game (N;W), and denote it by BF.
Table 2 presents the values for the SSI, the nucleolus and the BF for the case of equal recognition
probabilities, i.e., bpi = 1=3 for i = 1:::3. Interestingly, the Nucl and the BF give the same predictions
for all ve games in K1. One may notice that in the presence of veto players, the two indices   the
Nucl and the BF   attribute all power to the veto players and leave the other players with no power.
Moreover, the power is equally shared between the veto players if there are several of them. The Nucl
and the BF disagree with the SSI only in the case of the veto game [3; 2; 1; 1].
Table 2 Power Values for Five Possible Games with Three Groups.
SSI Nucl BF
[1; 1; 0; 0]
dictatorial
(1; 0; 0) (1; 0; 0) (1; 0; 0)
[3; 2; 1; 1]
veto
 
2
3
; 1
6
; 1
6

(1; 0; 0) (1; 0; 0)
[2; 1; 1; 0]
veto 12
 
1
2
; 1
2
; 0
  
1
2
; 1
2
; 0
  
1
2
; 1
2
; 0

[3; 1; 1; 1]
unanimity
 
1
3
; 1
3
; 1
3
  
1
3
; 1
3
; 1
3
  
1
3
; 1
3
; 1
3

[2; 1; 1; 1]
majority
 
1
3
; 1
3
; 1
3
  
1
3
; 1
3
; 1
3
  
1
3
; 1
3
; 1
3

One may notice that the example for the Adour-Garonne RBC corresponds to the last row in the
table, i.e., the three indices suggest equal distribution of power for the three water user groups.
19Stationarity requires that players follow the same strategy at every round t regardless of past o¤ers and responses
to past o¤ers.
20Moreover, Montero [29] has analyzed the above bargaining game in the case where i =  < 1 for all i = 1; :::; n.
She shows that if the vector p coincides with the nucleolus, then p is the unique vector of equilibrium payo¤s.
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I characterize the set of possible weights q1; q2; q3 for which the three indices disagree. First, the sets
Mi are not known exactly, however, due to equality (1), the following inequalities should be satised:
qi  !i for i = 1:::3.
The total number of representatives should stay the same:
3X
i=1
qi =
3X
i=1
!i + n  3.
The disagreement appears in the situation with one vetoer. Suppose, it is player 1. Then, we get
additional set of inequalities:
q1 + q2  q
q1 + q3  q
q2 + q3 < q:
Similar inequalities hold if player 2 or 3 is a vetoer.
4 Institutional design
In this section, I apply di¤erent power measures developed in the previous sections to address the
important question of how to design an RBC with a fair representation of di¤erent water usersinter-
ests. I focus on the distributive setting only, and tackle the problem in two steps. First, I characterize
voting rules that satisfy either of the two commonly used fairness principles, i.e., utilitarianism and
egalitarianism. The rst principle aims to maximize the total sum of votersutilities, whereas the
second seeks to equalize utility levels for equals. Unfortunately, as explained below, it is not always
possible to obtain such a rst-best rule. Therefore, in the second step, I discuss a way to obtain voting
rules that are as close as possible to the rst-best rule.
In the following, we compare two situations: the direct committee and the committee of repre-
sentatives. In the rst situation, there are no intermediate voting bodies, and water users represent
themselves. We will see that userspreferences play an important role in the design of the voting rule
to satisfy either principle. Not surprisingly, if the preferences are homogeneous then the total bud-
get should be distributed equally among all water users. However, the negotiation often takes place
across the representatives, and the share obtained by the representatives in the RBC is then divided
among the corresponding water users. It is not surprising that in this situation, not only do individual
preferences matter but also the number of groups and their sizes.
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As before, let us assume that the water usersgroups are labelled by i = 1; :::; k and their sizes
are denoted by ni. The total population is n =
Pk
i=1 ni. The utility function of any user in group
i = 1; :::; k is ui(). The total budget to be distributed is B, and the stakes obtained by each groups
representatives are Bi, i = 1; :::; k and
Pk
i=1Bi = B.
We assume that in the case of the direct committee, each water user j in group i obtains ij and:
kX
i=1
niX
j=1
ij = B. (2)
For the committee of representatives, we assume that there is no bargaining inside the groups, and
that the budget obtained is divided equally, i.e., ij = Bini .
Let us rst consider the utilitarian approach. If the water users represent themselves, i.e., there is
a direct committee, we seek a solution for the following maximization problem:
max
Pk
i=1
Pni
j=1 ui(ij)
s.t. (2).
First order conditions imply that:
u0i(ij) = , for all j = 1; ::; ni and i = 1; :::; k;
where  is the Lagrange multiplier attached to the constraint (2).
If we have a committee of representatives, then we have to maximize:
max
Pk
i=1 niui

Bi
ni

s.t.
Pk
i=1Bi = B.
From the rst order condition, one gets:
u0i

Bi
ni

= ,
where  is the Lagrange multiplier attached to the budget balance constraint.
To summarize, for the direct committee egalitarianism suggests equalizing utilities ui at ij, while
utilitarianism suggests equalizing marginal utilities u0i at the same point, ij. For the committee
of representatives, under the egalitarian approach the utility levels ui

Bi
ni

should be equalized, and
under utilitarian approach the marginal utilities u0i

Bi
ni

should be equalized.
If ui = u for all i = 1; :::; k then one gets:
ij =
B
n
and Bi =
niB
n
.
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Thus, under the assumption of homogeneous preferences,21 both principles suggest that the relative
budgets Bi
B
for the groups i = 1; :::; k should be equal to their relative sizes ni
n
.
Hereafter, we assume that each groups budget share Bi
B
is equal to one of the three power indices-
the SSI, the Nucl and the BF. Suppose that the voting rule in RBC is described by a simple game
(M;W), whereM = f1; 2; 3g is the set of water usersgroups, andW is the set of the winning coalitions.
Vector  = (1; 2; 3) denotes the budget shares of the water users representatives measured by the
SSI, the Nucl or the BF. Based on our conclusion, the rst-best situation is described by the condition
that the components of power index  induced by the game (M;W) coincide with ni
n
.
It is not always possible to obtain the rst-best situation, since vector  belongs to a simplex, while
the number of possible weighted majority games for each number of players k is nite (for example,
for k = 3, the number of weighted majority games in K1 is 5). Therefore, we try to nd simple games
from a specied class whose power index is as close as possible to the population shares. Specically,
we would like to design the simple game (M;W) 2 K1 in such a way that the distance between the
power index  and the relative sizes is as small as possible.22 Following [25], we consider quadratic
distance.23 Our problem is dened as follows:
min
(M;W)2K1
var ((M;W)) ;
and
var ((M;W)) =
3X
i=1
ni

1
n
  i
ni
2
: (3)
Term i
ni
indicates how much power (according to any of the three power indices) a water user in
21Of course, in reality the userspreferences are not homogeneous. For example, the utility for user group i = 1; 2; 3
can be specied as ui(x) = u

x
i

, where i is a characteristic for group i. Then, the egalitarian approach would suggest
equalizing Biini across the representatives in the committee, where Bi is the budget attributed to group i. This leads
to the conclusion that the representativesbudgets Bi should be proportional to ini as compared to ni in the case of
homogeneous preferences. For the utilitarian approach the conditions for Bi are more complicated and without knowing
the utility u one cannot be specic, except that 1iu
0

Bi
ini

should be equalized across all i.
22The general problem of nding a voting method which will give a good approximation to the desired powers (known
as an inverse problem), has been recently formulated for the Bz by Alon and Edelman [2]. The authors analyze power
distributions with most of the power concentrated on the small number of voters. They provide explicit bounds stating
that a Bz vector with weights concentrated on k < n players has to be near the Bz vector of a game with n  k dummy
players. Kurz [20] tightens this bound and obtains similar bounds for several other power indices. To the best of my
knowledge, there are no general results on the inverse problem for the Nucl, the SSI or the BF.
23Alternatively, it is possible to use other inequality measures, such as the Gini coe¢ cient or the Lorenz curve.
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group i gets given specic voting rules. The expression (3) can be simplied into:
var ((M;W)) =
3X
i=1
(i)
2
ni
  1
n
: (4)
Following [25], I illustrate the procedure for solving the problem in the case of three voters:
1. Calculate the power index  for each game in class K1 and nd the variance using (4);
2. Choose the game with the minimal variance.24
Hereafter, we express the variance in terms of population shares, i =
ni
n
; i = 1; 2; 3. Without loss
of generality, we assume that 1  2  3. We denote by:
V1 =
1
1
  1;
V2 =
1
4

1
1
+
1
2

  1;
V3 =
1
9

1
1
+
1
2
+
1
3

  1;
V4 =
1
36

16
1
+
1
2
+
1
3

  1:
The results for three power indices are presented in the Table 3 below.
Table 3 Variances for Five Possible Games with Three Groups
SSI Nucl and BF
[1; 1; 0; 0]
dictatorial
V1
n
V1
n
[3; 2; 1; 1]
veto
V4
n
V1
n
[2; 1; 1; 0]
veto 12
V2
n
V2
n
[3; 1; 1; 1]
unanimity
V3
n
V3
n
[2; 1; 1; 1]
majority
V3
n
V3
n
In Figure 1 we show the values of the two biggest groupspopulation shares, 1 and 2, for which
each of the ve games is optimal under the SSI, the Nucl and the BF.
24For large committees this method is di¢ cult to implement in practice as the number of possible games grows in an
exponential manner [25]. Given the relatively small number of main stakeholders on environmental committees, this
method is easy to use.
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Figure 1 The optimal rule for three voters under the SSI, the Nucl and the BF
One may notice that the simple majority ([2; 1; 1; 1]) and unanimity ([3; 1; 1; 1]) rules can not be
distinguished under the three power indices. Not surprisingly, the majority rule is optimal when the
three groups are not too di¤erent in terms of their population shares. On the contrary, dictatorial rule
([1; 1; 0; 0]) is optimal in the case where there is a relatively big group. Under the SSI there are four
di¤erent regions, while under the Nucl and the BF there are only three. The Nucl and the BF cannot
distinguish between veto ([3; 2; 1; 1]) and dictatorial rule. Under the SSI, veto rule is distinguished
from other rules.
The following example demonstrates the use of the technique.
Example: The Adour-Garonne RBC, 1987-2007 (continued)
From the calculations in the previous section we conclude that under the assumptions made, the
decision rule operating in the Adour-Garonne RBC is the simple majority rule. It implies that the
three groups have equal voting power according to the SSI, the Nucl and the BF. Hereafter, we will
check whether or not the three water user groups are fairly represented in the committee. In order to
do so, we check whether or not the three water users groups in the Adour-Garonne river basins are of
the same size.
In what follows, the data on the employment in industry and agriculture as well as the total
employment in the Adour-Garonne river basin in the period 1989-2006 is used as a proxy for the
number of di¤erent water users. People working in industry and agriculture are also domestic water
users, therefore the number of industrial and agricultural water users is estimated at half of the
number of employed people in industry and agriculture respectively. The number of domestic users
is calculated as the di¤erence between the total employment and half of people employed both in
industry and agriculture. Table 8 in the Appendix presents the population shares for the three water
user groups in the Adour-Garonne river basin in 1989-2006 under this assumption. It indicates that
the shares for industrial and agricultural users were declining over time whereas the share for domestic
users was increasing. The share for domestic water users is always the biggest and the share for
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agriculture is the smallest, while the gap in shares between the domestic water users and the two other
groups increases. Thus, the shares for the three groups are far from being equal, and we may conclude
that under our specic assumption, the domestic water users are under-represented, and that the two
other groups are over-represented.
Following the procedure described above we will identify the optimal decision rule for both scenarios.
To do so, we calculate variances according to the formulas from Table 3. In our case 1,2 or 3
corresponds to the populational shares for the domestic, industrial or agricultural users respectively.
As we have seen, the assumption 1  2  3 is satised.
In Table 4 below the four variances are calculated.
Table 4 Values of Variance Calculated for Adour-Garonne River Basin, 1989-2006
V1 V2 V3 V4
1989 0:165 2:128 2:477 0:355
1990 0:162 2:140 2:559 0:374
1991 0:156 2:210 2:661 0:397
1992 0:152 2:286 2:744 0:416
1993 0:146 2:382 2:877 0:447
1994 0:142 2:443 2:993 0:474
1995 0:139 2:456 3:104 0:501
1996 0:137 2:489 3:164 0:515
1997 0:133 2:581 3:250 0:535
1998 0:130 2:615 3:385 0:567
1999 0:126 2:663 3:559 0:609
2000 0:125 2:615 3:654 0:632
2001 0:123 2:634 3:780 0:663
2002 0:120 2:726 3:902 0:692
2003 0:117 2:803 3:993 0:714
2004 0:115 2:872 4:043 0:725
2005 0:110 2:978 4:323 0:793
2006 0:106 3:055 4:538 0:845
As one can see, the Nucl and the BF suggest either veto [3; 2; 1; 1] or dictatorial rule [1; 1; 0; 0]
since they cannot distinguish between the two, while the SSI prescribes dictatorial rule. The analysis
19
suggests the reinforcement of the representation of domestic water users in the committee.25 This is
in line with the recent conclusion of the French audit o¢ ce which has questioned the functioning of
the WAs [12]. One of the main critiques is that there is a persistent imbalance in the representation
of di¤erent categories of water users in the RBCs, with agriculture being regularly favoured by the
system (having a quasi-monopoly, [12]).
5 Policy Relevance and Concluding Remarks
In this paper, I adapt di¤erent tools and techniques from game theory, political science and welfare
economics to analyze decision making process within environmental committees. I use data on the
six French RBCs in the period 1987-2007 to illustrate the main points. The analysis may be useful
for researchers and policy makers seeking to improve the design of the decision making process over
environmental issues. In the context of French water policy, this work brings relevant insights to the
recent policy debates such as the functioning of the RBCs [12].
One of the main messages is that in deciding on the committee composition and voting rule, the
relationship between voting power indices (not just between voting weights), should be the main focus
of concern and attention of the negotiating parties. I illustrate this point under binary voting situations
using traditional power indices such as the Bz and the SSI. In general, the voting power measured
by these indices is not equivalent to voting weights. While the higher number of votes implies the
higher power, the relationship is not straightforward. However, as we have seen, for French RBCs
the relationship between the voting weights and power is nearly proportional as it is a special case of
limit behaviour [23]. Another important message is that often an increases in a members voting share
results in less than a proportional increase in his voting power. Moreover, as we have observed for
the Adour-Garonne RBC, an increase in a members voting share may lead to a decrease in his voting
power. Additionally, and as the analysis demonstrates, when some decision makers act as a block the
voting power of the block is not necessarily a sum of the individual powers.
I also show how to proceed with the analysis of the distributive voting situations, such as funding
local projects through subsidies. I apply the SSI which is well known in this context, as well as
two other power measures   the Nucl and the BF measure, which are less known but suitable in
this context. One of the main conclusions of this exercise is that often these indices give the same
predictions.
25One may argue that domestic water users should also include unemployed and retired people. However, the gap in
shares then becomes even bigger, and the conclusion does not change.
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In Section 4, I employ di¤erent power measures to address an important issue regarding the fair
representation of di¤erent interests within a committee (e.g., di¤erent water user categories in the
RBCs). First, I provide a descriptive analysis of the problem and a methodology for the design of
an optimal decision rule in the context of RBCs. The use of the technique is illustrated by a simple
computation exercise for the Adour-Garonne river basin. The main policy implication of the exercise,
which is in line with the conclusion of the French audit o¢ ce, is that up to now the committee com-
position and/or the voting rule has been biased against domestic water users. One of the possibilities
to improve the situation would be to increase the number of domestic users in the RBCs (and possi-
bly other representatives who vote in line with the domestic water users). Obviously, one should be
careful with the conclusions as they are based on a set of assumptions concerning the functioning of
the committees and the preferences of their members. For example, when considering the distributive
voting situations, we have assumed that the representatives of the administration act on behalf of
a particular water usersgroup. It is not straightforward to collect direct evidence supporting that
assumption. A careful examination of the proceedings reproducing the synthesis of the debates within
the committee would be a rst step in that direction.
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7 Appendix
Table 5 Distribution of Representatives in the Adour-Garonne RBC, 1987-2007
1987-1992 1993-1998 1999-2004 2005-2007
Agriculture 5 5 7 7
Industry&Energy 12 12 12 13
Urban communities 1 1 2 2
Rural communities 1 1 1 1
Coastal communities 0 0 0 0
Other communities 4 4 8 8
Region 6 6 5 6
District 18 18 18 18
Inter-district 0 0 2 3
Fishery & sh industry 3 3 4 4
Tourism 2 2 2 2
Water supply 3 3 2 2
Domestic water users 1 1 3 4
Ecologists 2 2 4 4
Professional bodies 8 8 9 8
Ministry of Environment 1 1 1 1
Ministry of Land Devt&Rural A¤ 1 1 1 1
Ministry of Health 1 1 1 1
Ministry of the Interior 1 0 1 1
Ministry of Industry 1 1 1 1
Ministry of Agriculture 1 0 1 0
Other ministries 6 5 7 4
State prefectures 6 6 6 6
Total 84 81 98 97
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Table 6 Power Values for the Adour-Garonne RBC, 1987-2007
1987-1992 1993-1998 1999-2004 2005-2007
qi=n Bz SSI qi=n Bz SSI qi=n Bz SSI qi=n Bz SSI
Agriculture 0:060 0:057 0:056 0:062 0:059 0:058 0:071 0:069 0:069 0:072 0:070 0:070
Industry&Energy 0:143 0:135 0:146 0:148 0:139 0:151 0:122 0:121 0:126 0:134 0:133 0:140
Urban communities 0:012 0:011 0:011 0:012 0:012 0:011 0:020 0:019 0:019 0:021 0:020 0:019
Rural communities 0:012 0:011 0:011 0:012 0:012 0:011 0:010 0:010 0:009 0:010 0:010 0:009
Coastal communities 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other communities 0:048 0:045 0:045 0:049 0:047 0:046 0:082 0:079 0:080 0:082 0:080 0:080
Region 0:071 0:068 0:068 0:074 0:071 0:070 0:051 0:049 0:049 0:062 0:060 0:059
District 0:214 0:253 0:248 0:222 0:262 0:258 0:184 0:210 0:210 0:186 0:211 0:212
Inter-district 0 0 0 0 0 0 0:020 0:019 0:019 0:031 0:030 0:029
Fishery & sh industry 0:036 0:034 0:033 0:037 0:035 0:034 0:041 0:039 0:039 0:041 0:040 0:039
Tourism 0:024 0:022 0:022 0:025 0:023 0:022 0:020 0:019 0:019 0:021 0:020 0:019
Water supply industry 0:036 0:034 0:033 0:037 0:035 0:034 0:020 0:019 0:019 0:021 0:020 0:019
Domestic water users 0:012 0:011 0:011 0:012 0:012 0:012 0:031 0:029 0:029 0:041 0:040 0:039
Ecologists 0:024 0:022 0:022 0:025 0:023 0:022 0:041 0:039 0:039 0:041 0:040 0:039
Professional bodies 0:095 0:093 0:093 0:099 0:096 0:110 0:092 0:090 0:091 0:082 0:080 0:081
Ministry of Environment 0:012 0:011 0:011 0:012 0:012 0:011 0:010 0:010 0:009 0:010 0:010 0:009
Ministry of Land Devt&Rural A¤ 0:012 0:011 0:011 0:012 0:012 0:011 0:010 0:010 0:009 0:010 0:010 0:009
Ministry of Health 0:012 0:011 0:011 0:012 0:012 0:011 0:010 0:010 0:009 0:010 0:010 0:009
Ministry of the Interior 0:012 0:011 0:011 0 0 0 0:010 0:010 0:009 0:010 0:010 0:009
Ministry of Industry 0:012 0:011 0:011 0:012 0:012 0:011 0:010 0:010 0:009 0:010 0:010 0:009
Ministry of Agriculture 0:012 0:011 0:011 0 0 0 0:010 0:010 0:009 0 0 0
Other ministries 0:071 0:068 0:068 0:062 0:059 0:058 0:071 0:069 0:069 0:041 0:040 0:039
State prefectures 0:071 0:068 0:068 0:074 0:071 0:070 0:061 0:059 0:059 0:062 0:060 0:059
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Table 7 Power Values for Adour-Garonne RBC (11 groups), 1987-2007
1987-1992 1993-1998 1999-2004 2005-2007
qi=n Bz SSI qi=n Bz SSI qi=n Bz SSI qi=n Bz SSI
Agriculture 0:083 0:074 0:074 0:074 0:066 0:065 0:092 0:089 0:086 0:082 0:078 0:076
Industry 0:143 0:135 0:138 0:148 0:139 0:144 0:122 0:107 0:103 0:134 0:138 0:131
Urban communities 0:012 0:009 0:008 0:012 0:008 0:007 0:020 0:018 0:015 0:021 0:021 0:020
Rural communities 0:012 0:009 0:008 0:012 0:008 0:007 0:010 0:009 0:008 0:010 0:011 0:012
Environmental ass. 0:167 0:147 0:156 0:160 0:141 0:150 0:184 0:173 0:188 0:196 0:176 0:187
Other communities 0:048 0:048 0:044 0:049 0:054 0:051 0:082 0:078 0:076 0:082 0:078 0:076
Districts and Regions 0:286 0:356 0:353 0:296 0:373 0:369 0:255 0:297 0:302 0:278 0:323 0:323
Ministry of Industry 0:012 0:009 0:008 0:012 0:008 0:007 0:010 0:009 0:008 0:010 0:011 0:012
Professional bodies 0:095 0:082 0:081 0:099 0:079 0:077 0:092 0:089 0:086 0:082 0:078 0:076
Other ministries 0:071 0:065 0:065 0:062 0:058 0:059 0:071 0:070 0:069 0:041 0:031 0:033
State prefectures 0:071 0:065 0:065 0:074 0:066 0:065 0:061 0:062 0:059 0:062 0:055 0:055
1. Farmers (including representatives of the Ministries of Agriculture, Land Development and Rural A¤airs);
2. Industry (including Energy);
3. Urban communities (domestic water users);
4. Rural communities;
5. Environmental associations (including shery, water suppliers, tourism, Ministries of Health, Environment, the Interior, associations of
domestic water users);
6. Other communities;
7. Districts and Regions;
8. Ministry of Industry;
9. Professional bodies;
10. Other ministries;
11. State prefectures.
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Table 8 Population Shares for Industrial, Agricultural and Residential Water Users in
the Adour-Garonne River Basin, 1989-2006
Industry Agriculture Domestic
1989 0:088 0:053 0:859
1990 0:088 0:051 0:861
1991 0:086 0:050 0:865
1992 0:083 0:049 0:868
1993 0:081 0:047 0:872
1994 0:079 0:045 0:876
1995 0:079 0:043 0:878
1996 0:078 0:043 0:879
1997 0:076 0:042 0:882
1998 0:075 0:040 0:885
1999 0:074 0:038 0:888
2000 0:075 0:036 0:889
2001 0:075 0:035 0:890
2002 0:073 0:034 0:893
2003 0:071 0:034 0:895
2004 0:070 0:033 0:897
2005 0:068 0:031 0:901
2006 0:066 0:030 0:904
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